ASIC implementation of random number generators using SR latches and its evaluation by unknown
EURASIP Journal on
Information Security
Torii et al. EURASIP Journal on Information Security  (2016) 2016:10 
DOI 10.1186/s13635-016-0036-1
RESEARCH Open Access
ASIC implementation of random number
generators using SR latches and its evaluation
Naoya Torii1,2*, Hirotaka Kokubo1, Dai Yamamoto1, Kouichi Itoh1, Masahiko Takenaka1 and Tsutomu
Matsumoto2
Abstract
A true random number generator (TRNG) is proposed and evaluated by field-programmable gate arrays (FPGA)
implementation that generates random numbers by exclusive-ORing (XORing) the outputs of many SR latches (Hata
and Ichikawa, IEICE Trans. Inf. Syst. E95-D(2):426–436, 2012). This enables compact implementation and generates
high-entropy random numbers.
In this paper, we fabricate and evaluate 39 TRNGs using SR latches on 0.18 μm ASICs. Random numbers are generated
by XORing the outputs of 256 SR latches. Our TRNGs pass the SP800-90B health tests and the AIS20/31 statistical tests
in changing temperatures (from −20 to 60 °C) and voltages (1.80 ± 0.15 V). We also perform an independent and
identically distributed (IID) test and calculate min-entropy according to the SP800-90B. With these tests, we are able to
confirm that our TRNGs are highly robust against environmental stress. The power consumption and circuit scale of
our TRNGs are 0.27 mW and 1240.5 gates, respectively. Our TRNGs that use SR latches are small enough to be
implemented in embedded devices.
Keywords: Random number generator, SR latch, AIS20/31, SP800-90B
1 Introduction
In the evolving era of the Internet of things (IoT), the
security of embedded devices such as sensors, smart
cards, and smart phones has become important for var-
ious applications, such as services that collect sensor
information, electronic money, and online banking. To
achieve security, the devices have to be installed with
cryptographic hardware for secure communication and
identification/authentication.
Cryptographic hardware achieves high-level security
such as through encryption processors, random number
generators, and tamper detection circuits.
One important element in the hardware is the
random number generator because it generates keys
for symmetric-key/public-key ciphers. Random numbers
with a low randomness make secret keys and private keys
predictable, which enables attackers to eavesdrop on com-
munication and forge signatures. Hence, the quality of
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random numbers affects the security of a system using
embedded devices.
In general, the output sequences of high-quality random
number generators are required to have two properties:
randomness and unpredictability. Randomness means
that “all elements of the sequence are generated indepen-
dently of each other, and the value of the next element
in the sequence cannot be predicted” [1]. Unpredictabil-
ity means that “no correlation between a seed and any
value generated from that seed should be evident; each
element of the sequence should appear to be the outcome
of an independent random event whose probability is 1/2”
[1], when a random sequence is generated from a random
seed.
Random number generators are classified into two
subgroups: true random number generators (TRNGs)
and deterministic random number generators (DRNGs).
TRNGs use an analog physical process as an entropy
source, such as electrical thermal noise or the jitters of a
clock signal. The source is considered to be unpredictable.
Hence, if the output sequence of a TRNG has the property
of randomness, the TRNG is considered to generate high-
quality random numbers. DRNGs use one or more inputs
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called “random seeds” and generate random sequences by
using a deterministic algorithm. DRNGs generate random
numbers by programming and satisfy the randomness
requirement when they are well designed. Hence, the ran-
dom seed for DRNGs needs unpredictability because the
output sequence is predictable when the seed is known.
Additionally, randomnumber generators are required to
generate high-quality random numbers regardless of envi-
ronmental changes. That is because embedded devices are
often exposed to environmental changes. Attackers could
intentionally reduce the quality of random numbers by
freezing embedded devices or by supplying a lower voltage
than rated.
Moreover, for resource-limited embedded devices,
TRNGs should be integrated on an application-specific
integrated circuit (ASIC). TRNGs that can be integrated
on digital ASICs have been proposed; however, there
are many problems in terms of noise, power consump-
tion, circuit scale, and design cost. A TRNG using SR
latches was proposed as a method to solve these problems
[2]. This TRNG has been implemented only on field-
programmable gate arrays (FPGAs). ASIC implementa-
tion is necessary for the mass production of this TRNG
because ASIC has the advantage of lower chip cost, lower
power consumption, and faster processing than FPGA.
It is unknown whether or not a TRNG on an ASIC is
able to generate high-quality random numbers. It is nec-
essary to implement and evaluate a TRNG on an ASIC
because random numbers are affected by the character-
istics of the semiconductor. TRNGs on FPGAs [2] have
only been evaluated with the NIST SP800-22 tests [1].
They have not been evaluated by tests dedicated to physi-
cal random numbers, namely BSI AIS20/31 [3] and NIST
SP800-90B (first draft) [4] (the latest is the second draft
[5]). These tests for physical random numbers will be
widely used in the near future. Moreover, the robustness
of TRNGs against temperature and voltage fluctuations
must be evaluated.
Our contributions In this paper, we implemented
TRNGs using SR latches on ASICs on the basis of the
TRNG on an FPGA [2]. The reason we focus on this
latch-based TRNG is that its design cost is small and high-
quality random numbers are expected to be generated in
any environment. This paper makes two contributions.
First, we fabricated TRNGs on 0.18-μm CMOS ASICs.
We evaluated whether or not TRNGs are able to generate
random numbers on these ASICs by using the AIS20/31
statistical tests and SP800-90B IID test for true random
numbers and examined whether our TRNGs have robust-
ness against temperature and voltage fluctuations. Addi-
tionally, we examined the SP800-22 tests for reference.
Second, we measured the power consumption and the cir-
cuit scale of the TRNGs and examined whether they can
be installed in embedded devices.
As a result, our TRNGs on ASICs were able to gener-
ate high-quality random numbers even if the environment
changed. Thus, our TRNGs are considered to improve
the security of embedded devices. In addition, they were
found to be small and low-power enough to be imple-
mented in embedded devices.
Organization of this paper This paper is organized as
follows. In Section 2, we briefly introduce work related to
our research. Section 3 is an outline of a TRNG using SR
latches. In Section 4, we describe an ASIC implementa-
tion of the TRNG. In addition, we measured the power
consumption of the TRNG on an ASIC. In Section 5, we
evaluate the quality of the true random numbers from the
TRNG by using the AIS20/31 and SP800-90B random-
ness statistical tests. In Section 6, we discuss random-
ness by increasing the number of latches, the result of
the statistical tests, and a comparison with the previous
implementation. Finally, Section 7 is a summary of this
research.
Parts of the content of this paper were published as a
peer-reviewed conference paper in [6].
2 Related work
The various TRNGs on ASICs and FPGAs have been
proposed so far. TRNGs are classified into three types:
direct amplification of a noise source, jittered oscillator
sampling, and metastable circuits.
The first type is a direct amplification of a noise source
[7, 8]. This type uses a random noise source as an entropy
source. A random sequence is generated by amplifying a
random noise source such as thermal noise digitized by a
comparator. This type of TRNG generates a high-quality
random number. However, it is difficult to integrate in
a high-density digital ASIC because it requires thermal
analog sensors and analog amplifiers.
The second type is jittered oscillator sampling. This
type uses the jitter of a clock oscillator as an entropy
source. A random number is generated by sampling a
high-frequency clock with a low-frequency clock by using
a D-type flip-flop (DFF). Some TRNGs were proposed
[9–13]. In [11], the low-frequency clock is generated by
connecting the FPGA to external components (resistances
and capacitors). In [10], it is done by using a PLL embed-
ded in the FPGA. In [12], it is done by using a CMOS clock
generator in an LSI. This type of TRNGneeds analog com-
ponents. Therefore, it is not cost effective because embed-
ded analog elements and analog/digital mixed ASICs are
needed.
The other implementations of the second type use the
jitter of a ring oscillator as an entropy source [14–16]. A
ring oscillator has a feedback structure composed of an
odd number of NOT gates. Random numbers are gen-
erated by the exclusive-OR (XOR) of multiple ring oscil-
lator outputs. This type of TRNG generates high-quality
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random numbers and has robustness against temperature
fluctuations. However, it would be not suitable for embed-
ded devices with limited resources because the ring oscil-
lator has large power consumption, noise, and circuit
scale.
The third type uses metastable circuits [2, 17–22]. This
type of TRNG is suitable for embedded devices because
of its small-scale and low-power consumption. The pro-
totypes of these proposed TRNGs were fabricated on
CMOS and can generate high-quality random numbers.
However, they need an additional dynamic adjustment for
the voltage or for the internal elements in the metastable
circuit. For example, in [17], a negative feedback loop
using a switched capacitor network is used to adjust
the DC bias of their proposed bistable circuit. In [19],
floating-gate memory is used to adjust the DC bias of the
SR latch efficiently. In [18], the bias of the SR latch is con-
trolled by measuring the metastable resolution time. This
adjustment needs a dedicated full-custom circuit includ-
ing analog components, which leads to a large design
cost at the transistor level. Moreover, it is necessary to
re-design the circuits when implementing them with dif-
ferent CMOS technology because the TRNGs often do
not work as expected under a different CMOS tech-
nology. In [20], a structure called transition effect ring
oscillator (TERO) was proposed and implemented on an
FPGA. TERO retrieves the entropy using the oscillatory
metastable operation. A TRNG was implemented by the
XOR of two TERO outputs on an FPGA, and the output
sequences passed the NIST800-22 tests. TERO structure
does not require feedback circuits and is expected to
be efficiently fabricated on CMOS. In [22], the stochas-
tic model of TERO was validated by implementation of
an 28-nm CMOS. However, the hardware size and the
throughput are not reported.
Hata and Ichikawa proposed a TRNGusing themetasta-
bility of SR latches and implemented it on an FPGA [2].
The design cost of this TRNG is quite small because it
uses only digital synchronous circuits and no feedback
circuits are required. In addition, the TRNG can save
power consumption by stopping the clock signal input to
the SR latches when random number generation is not
required. The random numbers from the TRNG pass the
NIST SP800-22 statistical tests. For the abovementioned
reasons, the TRNG proposed by Hata and Ichikawa is
expected to have better properties for embedded devices
than other TRNGs.
3 Random number generator using SR latches
3.1 General physical true random number configuration
A TRNG generally consists of three components: an
entropy source, a conditioning component, and a health
test component [3, 4]. A block diagram of a general TRNG
is shown in Fig. 1 [4]. The entropy source is “a component,
Fig. 1 General TRNG. A general TRNG generally consists of three
components: an entropy source, a conditioning component, and a
health test component. The entropy source is “a component, device,
or event that generates unpredictable output values” [3]. The
conditioning component reduces the bias and outputs random
numbers. The health test component checks the failures of the
entropy source continuously
device, or event that generates unpredictable output val-
ues” [3]. The conditioning component reduces the bias
and outputs a random number. If the entropy source out-
put has a high entropy, the conditioning component is not
always necessary. Therefore, it is optional. The health test
component checks the failures of the entropy source con-
tinuously. If the health test detects failures, it outputs an
alarm signal.
In this paper, we implemented a new entropy source to
evaluate its entropy. We call the source a “TRNG” and
call the entropy source output a “random number.” We
evaluated the entropy to decide whether the conditioning
component is necessary.
3.2 Random number generator using SR latches
In this section, we explain the method for generating ran-
dom numbers that was proposed by Hata and Ichikawa in
[2]. Their TRNG generates random numbers on the basis
of the metastability of SR latches. An SR latch consists of
two NAND gates and is commonly used to store one bit
of information. In this TRNG, the same signal is input to
the S and R of the SR latch, as shown in Fig. 2. When
input = 0, the SR latch is stable with output = 1. When
input changes from 0 to 1, the SR latch temporarily enters
Fig. 2 SR latch. An SR latch consists of two NAND gates and is
commonly used to store one bit of information. In this TRNG, the
same signal is input to the S and R of the SR latch
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ametastable state, and then it is stable with output = 0 or
1. Random numbers can be obtained from output by giv-
ing input clock signals by using this behavior. Ideally, the
probability of outputting 0 and 1 is equal; however, this
probability is actually biased. This is because of the dif-
ference in wiring delay between gates or the difference in
drive capability between two NAND gates. In many cases,
this SR latch generates only 0’s or only 1’s.
In this paper, we divide the SR latch into two types.
One is a random latch, and the other is a constant latch.
We defined a “random latch” as an SR latch whose output
sequence includes at least one transition between 0 and 1
and defined a “constant latch” as an SR latch that generates
only 0’s or only 1’s.
As described in Section 2, it is difficult to generate
high-quality random numbers by using only one SR latch
without controlling the latch characteristics continuously
on the basis of feedback from output sequences. Hata and
Ichikawa [2] proposed a new TRNG consisting of multi-
ple SR latches and an XOR gate without feedback. This
TRNG generates random numbers by XORing multiple
SR latches’ outputs. Hata and Ichikawa describe the imple-
mentation method on FPGA that was used to increase the
number of random latches. Additionally, the number of
latches to be XORed is evaluated. As a result, 64 or more
latches are necessary to generate random numbers to pass
the NIST SP800-22 statistical tests [1]. This TRNG can
reduce the bias of each latch by XORing many latches to
generate high-quality random numbers.
Problems There are three problems in [2]. First, this
TRNG was implemented only on FPGAs. Second, it was
not evaluated in various environments. Third, only one
TRNGwas evaluated. It is difficult to implement an FPGA
in mass-produced embedded devices such as smart cards
due to a large power consumption and chip cost, so
ASIC implementation is necessary for mass production.
TRNGs for embedded devices must be able to generate
high-quality random numbers in any environment. If a
TRNG generates random numbers with low entropy due
to environmental changes, the security of an embedded
device is compromised because secret information may
be predicted by attackers. In general, the characteristics
of a semiconductor, for example, drive capability and wire
delay, are influenced by both temperature and voltage
changes. Therefore, the quality of random numbers from
TRNGs is affected by both changes. Hence, robustness
against changes should be evaluated, but as yet, it has not
been. In addition, the semiconductor characteristics are
slightly different from chip to chip. Hence, multiple chips
should be evaluated.
4 ASIC implementation
We fabricated TRNGs using SR latches on 0.18-μm
CMOS ASICs (Fujitsu CS86 series [23]). The TRNGs
generate random numbers from the XOR of the outputs
of 256 SR latch units, as shown in Fig. 3.
The SR latches were custom-designed on the circuit
layout and implemented as a hard macro. This macro is
called an “SR latch unit” in this paper. 256 SR latch units,
XOR, and DFF are implemented automatically by using
circuit design tools. Hence, the design cost is quite small.
A block diagram of the SR latch unit is shown in Fig. 4.
It consists of two NAND gates and two buffer gates. To
increase the number of random latches, the SR latch unit
was designed as follows. Both two NAND gates and two
buffer gates were selected to have the same characteristics.
The wiring lengths between the NAND gates and buffer
gates were designed to be the same length; that is, they
were the same length from the SR latch unit input to each
NAND input, from the NAND output to the other NAND
input, and from the NAND output to the buffer input.
This enabled the corresponding wiring capacitance and
resistance within the SR latch unit to be equal. In FPGA
implementation [2], DFFs are used instead of the buffer
gates. DFF implementation may increase the number of
random latches; however, in our implementation, we used
the buffer gate to reduce the hardware size. This SR latch
unit structure is expected to increase the number of the
random latches.
The TRNGswere assembled as 28-pin dual in-line (DIP)
packages. Two types of TRNGs were fabricated: 20 stan-
dard TRNGs (using CS86MN, called “MN-TRNG”) and
19 low-power-consuming TRNGs (using CS86ML, called
“ML-TRNG”).
The cell sets of CS86MN have standard transistor char-
acteristics, and those of CS86ML have transistor char-
acteristics with a low leak current. CS86ML is suitable
for designing mobile devices that require low power con-
sumption. For example, the delay time, power consump-
tion, and leakage power of 2-input NAND cells is 88 ps,
40.1 nW/MHz, and 0.023 nW for CS86MN and 136 ps,
38.3 nW/MHz, and 0.0067 nW for CS86ML [23].
4.1 Power consumption and circuit scale
We measured the power and current consumption of the
TRNGs with a direct current ammeter. According to our
Fig. 3 Block diagram of random number generator [2]. This TRNG
generates random numbers from the XOR of 256 SR latch units’
outputs
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Fig. 4 SR latch unit. A SR latch unit consists of NAND gates and buffer
gates. The wiring lengths between gates are designed to be equal to
increase the possibility of the latches being random latches
experimental measurements, the average power/current
consumption of both the MN-TRNG and ML-TRNG
ASICs is 270 μW/150 μA and 252 μW/140 μA, respec-
tively. The current consumption of common ASICs used
for contactless smart cards is approximately 1 mA [24].
The current consumption of our TRNGs was much
smaller than this value, so the TRNGs are practical and
useful.
Additionally, we measured the circuit scale of our
TRNGs. In the following discussion, one gate is equiva-
lent to a 2-1 NAND gate (2-bit input and 1-bit output).
The TRNG consists of 256 SR latch units including two
2-1 NAND gates and two buffer gates, a 256-1 XOR gate,
and a 1-bit flip-flop to store a random number temporar-
ily. Our TRNG was synthesized with Design Compiler
2003.03, and the circuit scale was 1240.5 gates. This
evaluation did not include the 256-1 multiplexer (256-
1 MUL) and the 2-1 multiplexer (2-1 MUL) which will
be described in Section 5.1 because they were for the
evaluations of each latch output and not necessary for
practical use. On the other hand, we measured the power
consumption of our chip including the 256-1 MUL and
the 2-1 MUL. We considered the power consumption
was negligible because it was measured when the 256-
1 MUL was not used and 2-1 MUL passed the random
numbers.
We consider our TRNGs to be small enough to be
implemented in a chip for embedded devices.
4.2 Clock frequency
We selected the clock frequency (that is, the through-
put of the TRNG) as 2.5 MHz which was fast enough
for embedded systems to generate session keys and ses-
sion random numbers. We implemented the TRNG on
an FPGA and confirmed the evaluations of the clock fre-
quency described in [2]. From this evaluation, we selected
the clock frequency of the ASIC implementation with
enough margins. The fastest throughput of our TRNG is
the future work to be considered.
5 Evaluation
In this section, we evaluate whether our TRNGs fabri-
cated on ASICs generate high-quality random numbers
regardless of environmental changes. As mentioned in
Section 3, TRNGsmay be influenced by both temperature
and voltage fluctuations.
5.1 Evaluation system
Our experimental system for the acquisition of random
numbers is shown in Fig. 5. This figure shows the main
function blocks. The system consists of two boards: a
custom-made board for the ASICs of the TRNGs and a
Spartan-3E starter kit board with a Xilinx FPGA for con-
trolling the TRNGs [25] (hereafter, called “FPGA board”).
The core voltage to the TRNGs was supplied by using a
stabilizing power supply, which was able to adjust the sup-
ply voltage at intervals of 0.01 V. The clock signals were
input to the TRNGs through the FPGA board. The clock
by the 50-MHz oscillator was divided into 2.5 MHz by
a digital clock manager (DCM) on the FPGA board and
inputted to the TRNG chip. Random numbers generated
by the TRNGs were written to a micro SD card via a block
RAM and SD writing module on the FPGA board. We
acquired not only random numbers but also the output of
each latch for further evaluation. The PC set commands to
the command register in the TRNG chip via a PC interface
on the FPGA board. By setting the command register, two
multiplexers, the 256-1 multiplexer (256-1 MUL in Fig. 5)
and 2-1 multiplexer (2-1 MUL in Fig. 5), were controlled
to output either random numbers or each latch. The ran-
dom numbers or the outputs of each latch in SD card were
moved to a hard disk in the PC manually.
In this environment, we evaluated the random num-
bers generated by all of the 39 TRNGs while changing the
temperature and voltage. The core voltage was changed
to 1.65 V (1.80–0.15 V), 1.80 V (standard), and 1.95 V
(1.80 + 0.15 V) by the stabilizing power supply. The tem-
perature was maintained at −20 and 60 °C by using a con-
stant temperature oven. We also collected data at room
temperature (≈ 27 °C). Only the custom-made board for
the TRNGs was put in the constant temperature oven.
The FPGA board was always operated at the rated voltage
and room temperature. These two boards were connected
through a low/high temperature resistant cable.
5.2 Evaluation of randomness
5.2.1 Preliminary: health test by SP800-90B
As a preliminary test, we evaluated random numbers with
our TRNGs by using a health test defined in SP800-90B
[4]. This test checks for failures of the entropy source
continuously. Therefore, a health test circuit should be
embedded in our TRNG chips. However, we did not
implement this circuit on our fabricated chips because
the purpose of the implementation was to evaluate the
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Fig. 5 Experimental system for the acquisition of random numbers. Our experimental system consists of two boards: a custom-made board for the
ASICs of the TRNGs and a Spartan-3E starter kit board with a Xilinx FPGA for controlling the TRNGs. Random numbers generated by the TRNGs were
written to a micro SD card via a block RAM and SD writing module on an FPGA board. We acquired not only the random numbers but also the
output of each latch
entropy of a latch-based random number generator.
Instead, we performed the health test off-line on a PC
using the random numbers acquired by the evaluation
system in Section 5.1 because the TRNGs would not
be suitable for practical use if the random numbers fail
the health test. We acquired approximately 5.5 Mbits of
random numbers from each TRNG while changing the
temperature and voltage.
The health test consists of two tests: a repetition count
test and an adaptive proportion test. A false positive rate,
which is the probability of ideal true random numbers
failing these tests, is set to 2−30 as recommended in
SP800-90B.
[Repetition count test] The goal of the repetition count
test is “to quickly detect a catastrophic failure that causes
the noise source to become ‘stuck’ on a single output value
for a long time” [4].
The test procedure is as follows. If the same value (0 or
1) appears consecutively c times or more in a sequence
of random numbers, the random numbers are a failure,
where c = ceiling (1 + 30/min-entropy). In this paper, c
is 32, andmin-entropy will be mentioned in Section 5.2.3.
[Adaptive proportion test] The goal of the adaptive pro-
portion test is “to detect a large loss of entropy, such
as might occur as a result of some physical failure or
environmental change affecting the noise source” [4].
The test procedure is as follows. First, we obtain a 1-
bit value from the beginning of the random numbers as
a reference value. Second, we obtain one block from the
succeeding random numbers. The bit length of a block is
represented by the window size, and if the reference value
appears greater than the cutoff times in a block, the ran-
dom numbers are a failure. The size of the cutoff is defined
by the false positive rate, min-entropy, and window size.
This procedure is repeated until the end of the random
numbers. In our evaluations, the window size and cutoff
were 64 and 55 for test settings I and 4096 and 2240 for
test settings II. That is, about 84,700 blocks were evaluated
for test settings I, and about 1350 blocks were evaluated
for test settings II, in each case of random numbers.
In this test, the cutoff value is different from that in
SP800-90B when the window size is 64 because the value
is expected to be incorrect on the basis of the calculation
written in the footnote on page 35 in SP800-90B [4].
The random numbers from the MN-TRNGs and ML-
TRNGs passed all of the health tests in the nine cases of
temperatures and voltages. In [6], ML-TRNGs failed some
of the tests in some of the conditions. However, by cor-
recting the cutoff value, the ML-TRNGs passed all health
tests in the nine cases. From this test, our TRNGs would
pass the health test continuously if the health test circuit
were embedded in our TRNG chip.
We did not evaluate the total failure test in AIS20/31
for the same purpose, because “the test should be selected
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with regard to the stochastic model of the noise source”
[3] and the stochastic model of our TRNG is further work
to be considered.
5.2.2 AIS20/31 statistical tests
We evaluated the random numbers in various temper-
atures and voltages by using the AIS20/31 statistical
tests [3]. The data set for this test was same as that in
Section 5.2.1. AIS20/31 includes an evaluation criterion
for the true random number generators defined by BSI,
i.e., the German Federal Office for Information Security.
AIS20/31 includes eight standard statistical tests such as
the poker test, the long run test, and the uniform distribu-
tion test. We evaluated our TRNGs by using the statistical
tests for test procedure A in AIS20/31. In this procedure,
five statistical tests out of eight are used. For an ideal
random number, the probability of passing the tests is
≈ 0.9987, and that of failing more than two tests is ≈ 0. If
one test is failed, a second run is done. If the second test is
failed, test procedure A is failed [3].
AIS20/31 classifies TRNGs into two classes: the PTG.1
class and PTG.2 class. The TRNGs in the PTG.1 class can
be used for random number generation for challenge and
response authentication. The TRNGs in the PTG.2 class
can be used for key and seed generation for pseudo ran-
dom number generators, so these TRNGs provide higher
security than those in the PTG.1 class.
Figure 6 shows the rate of TRNGs that passed the
AIS20/31 tests. The horizontal axis shows the environ-
ment at various temperatures and voltages. The vertical
axis shows the rate of the PRNGs that passed the tests.
The MN-TRNGs passed the tests in all cases, so our MN-
TRNGs have robustness against temperature and voltage
fluctuations. The ML-TRNGs, however, failed tests only
in two cases out of 171 cases. Two of the 19 ML-TRNG
chips failed the tests, and each ML-TRNG chip failed one
Fig. 6 AIS20/31 pass rate. The MN-TRNGs passed the AIS20/31 tests in
all 180 cases. The ML-TRNGs, however, failed tests in two cases out of
171
case out of nine. In other words, 17 chips out of 19 passed
all AIS20/31 statistical tests. For reference, we retested
the random numbers of two failed chips by retrieving the
numbers from the random number files by deleting the
first 10,000 bits and adding the bits at the end of the
original random numbers. Both of the random numbers
passed the AIS20/31 statistical tests. We believe that the
ML-TRNGs also have robustness against temperature and
voltage fluctuations regardless of the failures of the first
tests. In Section 6.1, we discuss the ML-TRNGs from the
aspect of the number of SR latches.
From these evaluations, our TRNGs passed the stan-
dard statistical test for PTG.1 and PTG.2 from the aspect
of AIS20/31. More tests including the total failure test
and the online test are required to regard our TRNGs as
PTG.1, and additionally, a stochastic model of the entropy
source is required for PTG.2; however, this further work is
to be considered.
5.2.3 SP800-90B IID test andmin-entropy
We use min-entropy as the objective criterion of ran-
domness. Min-entropy is defined as the lower bound of
the amount of information of a random variable [4]. The
min-entropy per bit of ideal true random numbers is 1
because the proportion of 0’s and 1’s is ideally 0.5. The
method of estimating the min-entropy differs depending
on whether the TRNG is independent and identically dis-
tributed (IID). A random sequence is evaluated as IID
when “each element of the sequence has the same prob-
ability distribution as the other values and all values are
mutually independent” [4]. The evaluation consists of six
shuffling tests and a statistical test. Therefore, first, we
implemented software for IID verification tests in accor-
dance with SP800-90B and evaluated our TRNGs by using
this test. The data set for this test was same as that in
Section 5.2.1.
Figure 7 shows the IID test pass rate for the nine
cases of temperatures and voltages. From the results, the
MN-TRNGs passed all 180 cases, so we performed min-
entropy estimation for IID sources (see Section 9.2 in [4]).
In contrast, the ML-TRNGs passed 166 out of 171 cases.
We, however, regarded the ML-TRNGs as IID sources
because all 19 chips passed the tests under normal condi-
tions, i.e., 27 °C and 1.80 V, and 14 chips out of 19 passed
all tests in the nine cases of temperatures and voltages.
To pass all tests, we believe that a ML-TRNG is necessary
to connect an appropriate conditioning component or to
increase the number of latches, as discussed in Section 6.
Figures 8 and 9 show the results of min-entropy esti-
mation in MN-TRNGs andML-TRNGs, respectively. The
x indication, the upper line, and the lower line show the
average, maximum, and minimum of the min-entropy
per bits in all test cases, respectively. The min-entropy is
very close to “1” (i.e., ideal min-entropy) in both types of
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Fig. 7 IID evaluation test pass rate. The MN-TRNGs passed the IID
evaluation test in all 180 cases. In contrast, the ML-TRNGs passed 166
out of 171 cases. We, however, regarded the ML-TRNGs as IID sources
because they passed the tests under the normal conditions, i.e., 27 °C
and 1.80 V
PRNGs. Hence, our PRNGs have a very high min-entropy
regardless of the temperature or voltage.
5.2.4 SP800-22 statistical tests
We evaluated the random numbers by using the SP800-
22 statistical tests [1] for reference because these tests are
said to be useful for analyzing random number sources in
AIS20/31 [3]. We used an NIST statistical test suite called
“sts-2.1.2” [26] and the recommended parameter settings
of AIS 20/31. We selected a MN-TRNG chip and acquired
random numbers at the room temperature (25 °C) and the
rated voltage (1.8 V). Two data sets (data set 1 and 2) were
evaluated and the size of each data set was about 230 bits.
Fig. 8Min-entropy estimation (MN). The min-entropy is very close to
“1” (i.e., ideal min-entropy) in the nine cases of temperatures and
voltages. The x indication, the upper line, and the lower of line show
the average, maximum, and minimum of the min-entropy in the test
cases, respectively
Fig. 9Min-entropy estimation (ML). The min-entropy was very close
to “1” (the ideal min-entropy) in the nine cases of temperatures and
voltages. The x indication, the upper line, and the lower line show the
average, maximum, and minimum of the min-entropy in the test
cases, respectively
The results of the tests are shown in Table 1. The aster-
isk denotes that a test consisted of several sub-tests and
that the minimum p value is shown. The data set 1 passed
the all tests and the data set 2 passed tests except for
non-overlapping template matching test. The values of the
failed test are shown in bold type.We consider the number
of chips should increase to evaluate the sequence of MN-
TRNG correctly. If the non-negligible number of chips
fail the SP800-22 statistical tests, MN-TRNG would need
the appropriate conditioning component or increase the
number of latches in the MN-TRNG to pass all statistical
tests in SP800-22.
5.3 Evaluation of random latches
In this section, we evaluated the behavior of each SR latch
in order to clarify the reasons for the robustness against
temperature and voltage fluctuations of our TRNGs.
We defined the quality of the random latches based
on the proportion of 1’s in an output sequence. If the
sequence of a random latch has an equal distribution of
0 and 1, it is considered to be a good random number.
Therefore, 50 % is the highest quality, and 0 % (all 0) or
100 % (all 1) is the worst. In [2], it is reported that the
output of the TRNG passed the SP800-22 statistical tests
when there were one high-quality random latch and 17
low quality ones. Therefore, our TRNG generates good
random numbers, if there are a few high-quality random
latches against temperature and voltage fluctuations.
We focused on two evaluation axes: the number of ran-
dom latches and the quality of random numbers from
each random latch in our TRNG. We acquired an output
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Table 1 NIST 800-22 statistical test result. We evaluated the random numbers by using the SP800-22 statistical tests [1] for reference.
We used an NIST statistical test suite called “sts-2.1.2” [26] and the recommended parameter settings of AIS 20/31. We selected a
MN-TRNG and acquired random numbers at the room temperature (25 °C) and the rated voltage (1.8 V)
Data set 1 Data set 2
Statistical test p value Proportion p value Proportion
Frequency 0.352760 0.9897 0.981009 0.9869
Block frequency 0.198458 0.9814 0.065912 0.9944
Cumulative sums* 0.017970 0.9888 0.100602 0.9879
Runs 0.392050 0.9888 0.423587 0.9879
Longest run 0.054577 0.9860 0.193532 0.9870
Rank 0.013864 0.9897 0.773966 0.9888
FFT 0.405158 0.9935 0.428692 0.9832
Non-overlapping template* 0.009459 0.9897 0.763056 0.9786
Overlapping template 0.725810 0.9851 0.067077 0.9907
Universal 0.571253 0.9879 0.731471 0.9907
Approxi. entropy 0.163454 0.9916 0.144099 0.9934
Random excursions* 0.095691 0.9985 0.120217 0.9807
Random excursions varian* 0.097473 0.9923 0.035873 0.9985
Serial* 0.034210 0.9935 0.557853 0.9925
Linear complexity 0.051110 0.9860 0.750162 0.9888
Two data sets (data sets 1 and 2) were evaluated and the size of each data set was about 230 bits. The asterisk denotes that a test consisted of several sub-tests and that the
minimum p value is shown. Data set 1 passed all the tests and data set 2 passed the tests except for non-overlapping template matching test. The values of failed tests are
shown in italic type
sequence of about 21K bits from each SR latch in the nine
cases of temperatures and voltages per chip.
5.3.1 The number of random latches
We evaluated the number of random latches in the 256
latches. Figures 10 and 11 show the number of random
Fig. 10 Number of random latches (MN). The bar graphs and the
upper and lower lines show the average, maximum, and minimum of
the number of random latches in the nine cases of temperatures and
voltages, respectively
latches in MN-TRNGs and ML-TRNGs, respectively. The
bars graphs and the upper and lower lines show the aver-
age, maximum, and minimum of the number of random
latches in the test cases.
The higher the temperature and voltage were, the larger
the average number of random latches was for both types
Fig. 11 Number of random latches (ML). The bar graphs and the
upper and lower lines show the average, maximum, and minimum of
the number of random latches in the nine cases of temperatures and
voltages, respectively
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of TRNGs, except in some cases. Even at −20 °C and
1.65 V, the number of random latches reached aminimum
of 20 for the ML-TRNGs. In addition, we observed that
some constant latches changed to random latches when
the environment changed.
The number of random latches for the MN-TRNGs,
whose average was approximately 42, was more stable
than for the ML-TRNGs, whose average was approxi-
mately 45.
5.3.2 The quality of random latches
Figures 12 and 13 show the quality of random latches
in MN-TRNGs and ML-TRNGs, respectively. Here, [a,b]
and (a,b) represent closed and open intervals, respectively.
For example, [30 %, 40 %) represent 30 % ≤ x < 40 %,
where x is the proportion of 1’s in the output sequence.
We considered the quality of random numbers to be the
same between 0–10 % and 90–100 %. Thus, the quality of
the output sequence was divided into five intervals. The
lowest part of the bar graph indicating [40 %, 60 %] rep-
resents random latches outputting high-quality random
numbers. Approximately 5 % of random latches were of
high-quality in any environment. In addition, we observed
that a high-quality random latch in a temperature and a
voltage became low quality one in other temperatures and
voltages. Hence, high-quality random latches was changed
when the environment changed.
5.3.3 Discussion of our TRNG
In any environment, there were approximately 42 random
latches, and approximately 5 % of all random latches were
high-quality random latches. Hence, there is expected
to be about two high-quality random latches in any
environment. From the experimental result in [2], we
expect that the TRNG including one high-quality random
Fig. 12 Quality of random latches (MN). Approximately 5 % of the
random latches were high-quality in the nine cases of temperatures
and voltages
latch generated high-quality random numbers. Therefore,
our TRNGs can generate high-quality random numbers.
Moreover, the number of random latches including biased
ones is expected to contribute to improving the quality of
random numbers produced by XOR operation [27].
6 Discussion
6.1 Randomness by increasing the number of latches
We expected that the quality of random numbers would
be improved if the number of implemented SR latches
increases. This is because our TRNGs generated random
numbers as the XOR of 256 SR latch outputs. To verify
this, we regarded the XOR of two actual TRNG outputs
as random numbers obtained from a virtual TRNG with
512 built-in SR latches and evaluated whether or not the
quality of the random numbers was improved. The vir-
tual TRNGs were generated as follows. We focused on
the TRNGs failing at least one test. If there were even
numbers of TRNGs that failed the same test in the same
environment, the XOR of each pair was regarded as the
virtual TRNG. Otherwise, the XOR of outputs from the
failing TRNGs and the TRNGs with the lowest min-
entropy in the same test/environment was regarded as the
virtual TRNG.
We evaluated the virtual TRNGs by using the AIS20/31
statistical tests. As a result, all the virtual PRNGs passed
the test. Through this evaluation, we verified that the 256
latches were not sufficient for the ML-TRNGs to pass all
AIS20/31 statistical tests, while the quality of the random
numbers could be improved by increasing the number of
SR latches.
6.2 Statistical tests and conditioning comportment
Table 2 shows the pass rates of the SP800-90B health
test, AIS20/31 statistical tests, and SP800-90B IID test.
Fig. 13 Quality of random latches (ML). Approximately 5 % of the
random latches were high-quality in the nine cases of temperatures
and voltages
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Table 2 Results of statistical tests
SP800-90B AIS20/31 SP800-90B
Health test Statistical test IID test
MN-TRNG 100 % 100 % 100 %
ML-TRNG 100 % 99 % 97 %
The pass rates of SP800-90B health test, AIS20/31 statistical test, and SP800-90B IID
test are shown. The pass rate based on the number of cases: the pairs of voltages
and temperatures. The chips of MN-TRNG passed the all tests (180 cases = 20
chips× 9 cases), and those of ML-TRNG passed all tests except two cases of AIS20/31
statistical tests and five cases of SP800-90B out of 171 cases (19 chips × 9 cases). We
consider that all MN-TRNGs and ML-TRNGs generate high-quality random numbers
The pass rate was based on the number of cases involv-
ing pairs of voltages and temperatures. MN-TRNG chips
passed all of the tests (180 cases = 20 chips × cases), and
the ML-TRNG chips passed all of the tests except for two
cases of the AIS20/31 statistical tests and five cases of the
SP800-90B IID test out of 171 cases (19 chips × 9 cases).
From these results, we found that all MN-TRNGs gen-
erated high-quality random numbers. We observed that
our MN-TRNGs generated unbiased random sequences
that had enough entropy. Therefore, their output random
sequences can be used without the conditioning com-
ponent in Section 3.1. We believe that the ML-TRNGs
also generated high-quality random numbers. However,
the quality of the numbers is expected to be improved by
increasing the number of latches per chip or by connect-
ing conditioning components, such as a linear-feedback
shift register (LFSR) [28] and other conditioning compo-
nents shown in AIS20/31 and SP800-90B.
6.3 Comparison
Table 3 shows a performance comparison of recent pro-
posed TRNGs that were fabricated on a CMOS ASIC. In
the table, it is difficult to compare the power consumption
and the throughput because the CMOS processes are dif-
ferent. In addition, the evaluationmethods of randomness
are different. Therefore, Table 3 shows state-of-the-art
TRNGs for reference. We believe that our TRNGs are well
balanced from the viewpoint of power and throughput
and are suitable for embedded systems.
7 Conclusions
In this paper, we fabricated two types of TRNGs using
SR latches on ASICs and evaluated the robustness of the
TRNGs against temperature and voltage fluctuations.
We validated that the TRNGs can generate random
numbers at a standard voltage and room temperature.
Furthermore, we evaluated that the random numbers
were generated in various conditions, where the temper-
ature was between −20 and 60 °C and the voltage was
between 1.65 and 1.95 V, in line with the AIS20/31 statisti-
cal tests [3], SP800-90B health tests, IID verification tests,
and min-entropy estimation [4].
As a result, we found that all of the MN-TRNGs (the
TRNGs on CS86MN with a standard power consump-
tion) generated high-quality random numbers that pass
all of the abovementioned tests in various environments.
Our TRNGs also generated high-quality random num-
bers continually because the min-entropy is stable at high
values. Some of the ML-TRNGs (the TRNG on CS86ML
with low power consumption) failed some of the AIS20/31
statistical tests and IID evaluation tests. However, the
quality of random numbers is expected to be improved
by increasing the number of SR latches or connecting an
appropriate conditioning component.
For these reasons, our TRNGs that use SR latches on
an ASIC have robustness against temperature and volt-
age fluctuations. The circuit scale and power consumption
of the TRNGs were 1240.5 gates and 270 μW, respec-
tively. Hence, our TRNGs were small in size and had a
low power consumption, which is suitable for embedded
devices.
We have come to the conclusion that our TRNGs as an
entropy source can be used, for example, generating cryp-
tographic keys, nonces for authentication, and seeds for
pseudo random number generators.
Table 3 Comparison with previously proposed TRNG. The performances comparison of recent proposed TRNGs were fabricated on
CMOS ASIC. It is difficult to compare the power consumption and the throughput fairly because the CMOS processes are different. In
addition, the evaluations of randomness are different. Therefore, this shows state-of-the-art TRNGs for reference. We think that our
TRNG is good balanced TRNG from the viewpoint of the power and the throughput
Entropy Reference Technology Power Throughput Post processing Random number evaluation
Direct amplification [8] 0.18 μm 3.6 mW 5 Mbps – FIPS140-1, Knuth 2nd ed.
Jitter oscillator sampling [12] 90 nm 240 μW 1.74 Mbps LSFR AIS31, Entopy dist.
[13] 65 nm – 7.5 Mbps None SP800-22Basic, DIEHARD
Metastable circuit [18] 0.13 μm 1mW 40 Kbps 5:1 decimation SP800-22 Basic
[19] 0.35 μm 9.4 μW 5 Kbps NSFR SP800-22 Basic
[21] 45 nm 7 mW 2.4 Gbps – SP800-22
This work(MN) 0.18 μm 270 μW 2.5 Mbps – SP800-90B, AIS20/31
This work(ML) 0.18 μm 252 μW 2.5 Mbps – SP800-90B, AIS20/31
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Future work will include considering hardware size and
power consumption including the conditioning compo-
nent, the health circuit component, and I/O interface,
discussion on the experiment in terms of larger fluctu-
ations of temperature, voltage, and clock frequency. In
addition, we will evaluate a version of our TRNGs that has
been fabricated by advanced LSI processes.
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